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I. INTRODUCTION

The traditional wiretap or electronic eavesdropping device
constitutes a dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its
scope-without regard to the participants or the nature of the
conversations. It intrudes upon the privacy of those not even
suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate of
conversations.
- Justice William 0. Douglas 1
For the past forty years, theory and practice in electronic
surveillance have enjoyed an uneasy coexistence. In theory, under
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968

1.

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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("Title III"),2 government agents must use wire and electronic taps
sparingly, 3 and only under strict judicial supervision. 4 In practice,
however, federal courts have recognized countless loopholes and
exceptions,5 leading critics to wonder whether Title III meaningfully
6
limits state investigatory power.
Nowhere is this tension more apparent than in the context of
"minimization."7 Under Title III, government agents conducting
electronic surveillance
must "minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter."8 They must not listen in on any more private communication
than is necessary. But what, exactly, must "minimization" entail? The
statute itself does not say, though the Senate Report-which endorsed
the Warren Court's reasoning in Berger v. New York 9 -suggests that
the requirement was meant to apply broadly, against all unnecessary
interceptions. 10
The lower courts, however, had different ideas. Instead of
adopting a bright-line rule, federal courts since the 1970s have carved
out numerous partial exceptions to the minimization requirement.
They have largely exempted foreign-language calls,1 1 as well as short

2.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2006).

3.
§ 2518(3)(a) (requiring prosecutors seeking an electronic surveillance warrant to first
demonstrate probable cause to believe that the subject of the surveillance has committed a
serious felony); § 2518(3)(c) (requiring prosecutors seeking an electronic surveillance warrant to
first demonstrate that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous").
4.
§ 2518(6) (requiring prosecutors conducting electronic surveillance to make regular
status reports to the judge who issued the authorization).
5.
See infra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.

6. See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing
the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 75 (1997) ('There is
substantial evidence ... that the protections initially established in 1968 and affirmed in 1986
are not working as intended. It appears increasingly apparent that components of the balanced
legislative scheme have been watered down by Congress itself and by the judiciary.').

7.

§ 2518(5).

8.

Id.

9.

S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154.

10. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967) ("[I]t is not asking too much that officers
be required to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost
secrets of one's home or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than
eavesdropping devices.").
11. United States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Given the
difficulty and expense of providing for simultaneous translation of Sicilian conversations, and the
delay in activating the wiretaps that such a requirement might have caused, the Court finds that
the government's minimization efforts are acceptable under Title III and the fourth
amendment.").
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calls,12 "ambiguous" calls, 13 and calls monitored during the early
stages of an investigation. 14 The underlying test-adopted by the
Burger Court in Scott v. United States-is a test of "reasonableness,"
and grants a high degree of deference to police and prosecutorial
15
decisions.
Further complicating matters is the fact that Congress passed
Title III in 1968, well before the "tech boom" of the 1980s and early
1990s made cell phones, text messages, and e-mail commonplace. 16
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA")
partially addressed this problem, extending Title III to cover
"electronic" as well as "wire" communications. 17 However, the statute
provided no clear guidance on how to minimize these new types of
messages.' 8 Phone surveillance had long been governed by a temporal
restriction, commonly known as the "two-minute" rule. But this
approach was ill-suited for nonverbal communications such as e-mail
and text messages.' 9 Did Congress intend for the minimization
requirement to provide the same level of privacy protection to e-mail
and text messages as it did for phone calls? And, regardless of

12. United States v. Segura, 318 F. App'x 706, 712 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that
minimization is not required for any phone calls under two minutes long).
13. United States v. Williams, 109 F.3d 502, 507 (8th Cir. 1997).
14. United States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 1989) ("It has been recognized
that monitors may need to listen for longer periods of time in the early stages of such
investigations in order to determine the identity of speakers and significance of conversations.').
15. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978) ('Because of the necessarily ad hoc
nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law which will
decide every case. The statute does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant conversations,
but rather instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to 'minimize' the
interception of such conversations.").
16. According to the Senate Report accompanying the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, the Federal Communications Commission approved the use of cellular phones for the first
time in 1981. S.REP No. 99-541 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3563.
17. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining
"electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectric or photooptical system that affects interstate of foreign commerce').
18. However, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report did provide some guidance:
[Allthough the statutory standards for minimizing wire, oral, and electronic
communications are the same under the proposed subsection 2518(5), the technology
used to either transmit or intercept an electronic message such as electronic mail or a
computer data transmission ordinarily will not make it possible... to minimize in the
same manner as with a wire interception.
S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585.
19. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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congressional intent, how much protection has the minimization
20
requirement reallyprovided for these nonverbal communications?
The following analysis addresses these issues and, more
specifically, attempts to answer four closely related questions: (1) How
much privacy protection does the minimization requirement provide to
nonverbal, electronic communications? (2) How different is this
protection from what the law affords to phone calls under Title III?
(3) Why, as law-abiding citizens, should we care? and (4) In light of the
previous three questions, does it make sense to retain the
minimization requirement in the context of electronic intercepts?
Ultimately, this analysis will demonstrate that the
minimization requirement makes no sense in the context of nonverbal,
electronic interceptions. Courts have spent more than twenty years
watering this requirement down, leaving behind a bizarre, hollowedout protection that serves as a procedural nuisance to law enforcement
without providing meaningful protection to individual privacy. In a
very real sense, courts have achieved the worst of both worlds.
In reaching this conclusion, this Note is organized into four
parts. Part I provides a brief history of electronic surveillance law,
with an emphasis on the development and subsequent application of
the minimization requirement. Part II examines the current
minimization requirement and seeks to discern what privacy
protections it provides, if any, for electronic communications such as
text messages. Part III compares and contrasts the modern
minimization requirement with the "traditional" 1968 version,
concluding that the latter does in fact provide more protection to
phone calls than the former does to electronic communications.
Finally, Part IV asks why we should we care about whether
minimization fails to protect electronic communications. In answering
that all-important question, Part IV presents and critiques the
competing positions of privacy purists ("purists") 21 and privacy

20. The general consensus among legal scholars appears to be that it has provided only
modest protection, at best, to nonverbal communications. See, e.g., Larry Downes, Electronic
Communications and the Plain View Exception: More "Bad Physics", 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239,
266 (1994) ("Minimization as it has been understood up until now can have no meaning in an
increasingly digital world.").
21. For the purposes of this Note, "purists" are scholars and jurists who believe that
surveillance is dangerous not only because of its potential to violate due process, but because it
necessarily involves government agents observing the private details of an individual's life.
Purists believe that surveillance, if allowed at all, must be tightly controlled at every step of the
process. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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pragmatists ("pragmatists"),22 ultimately concluding, however
grudgingly, that pragmatists have the better argument and that the
minimization requirement makes no sense in the context of electronic
interceptions.
II. ACTION AND OVER-REACTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LAW

The history of U.S. surveillance law is one of dueling
philosophies: privacy purity versus privacy pragmatism. 23 As early as
the 1860s, state police forces had begun tapping telegraph
transmissions in criminal investigations, 24 a technique that would
develop into the modern wiretap a generation later. 25 In response,
increasing numbers of academics publicly condemned such techniques,
26
arguing for stronger legal protections for individual privacy.
Caught in the middle were Congress and the Supreme Court.
Although they sat out the early rounds of the debate, 27 both were
eventually forced to act and, in so doing, to take sides between the
purists and the pragmatists. By their own accounts, the Court and
Congress struggled mightily over the years to carve out middle-ground
positions-reconciling, to the extent possible, the interests of law
enforcement with those of privacy advocates. 28 But history soon put
22. "Pragmatists" are scholars and jurists who look with skepticism on the idea that there
is any absolute right to being 'let alone" and who look with even greater skepticism at the idea
that the government should hamstring its law enforcement officers to protect such a right. See,
e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("However obnoxious
eavesdroppers may be they are assuredly not engaged in a more 'ignoble' or 'dirty business' than
are bribers, thieves, burglars, robbers, rapists, kidnappers, and murderers.... And it cannot be
denied that to deal with such specimens of our society, eavesdroppers are not merely useful, they
are frequently a necessity.").
23. See infra Part IV (comparing and contrasting the purist and pragmatist approaches).
24. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 45 (discussing an 1862 California statute enacted to put an end
to the practice).
25. Id. at 46.
26. See, e.g., Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890) ("Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be
taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls
the right 'to be let alone'.... [N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' ")
(quoting COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). Brandeis, one of the coauthors of this piece, would
return to the same theme in his famous Olmstead dissent. 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
27. See S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 (noting that
the Supreme Court did not consider the issue until 1928, nor did Congress until 1934).
28. Compare Berger, 388 U.S. at 63-64 ('CThe Fourth Amendment does not make the
'precincts of the home or the office ... sanctuaries where the law can never reach,' but it does
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the lie to such claims of balanced neutrality. Congress, responding to
citizens' fears of unchecked government power, placed increasingly
tight restrictions on police surveillance. 29 The Court, in turn, took a
largely pragmatic approach, interpreting congressional acts as
standards rather than rules, and showing a high degree of deference
30
to law enforcement decisions.
From this decades-long tug-of-war between bright-line rules
and deferential standards, our current, jumbled system of surveillance
law eventually emerged.
A. From the Many, One? The Tentative Emergence of
Federal Wiretap Regulation
Prior to the Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States,
31
police wiretaps were regulated, if at all, by state-level authorities.
3
2
Many states banned the practice outright, though evidence suggests
33
that police departments sometimes just ignored these prohibitions.
At the same time, a broader constitutional question loomed in the
background: Do wiretaps implicate the Fourth Amendment, 34 or is
electronic surveillance beyond the scope of what the Framers would
35
have recognized as "searches" or "seizures"?

prescribe a constitutional standard that must be met before official invasion is permissible.")

(citations omitted), with S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153
('Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and
(2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception
of wire and oral communications may be authorized.").
29. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (establishing numerous procedural requirements
that law enforcement officers must meet before and during electronic wiretaps).

30. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) ("Because of the necessarily ad
hoc nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law which
will decide every case.").
31. Federal law enforcement was in its infancy during this time, so it is not surprising that
wiretaps and the rules governing them came primarily from the states. For an overview of early
state wiretap laws, see Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-46.
32. New York and Illinois banned police wiretaps in 1895. California extended its ban on
telegraph surveillance to phone surveillance in 1905. Id. at 46.
33. See id. ("[A] New York legislative committee found that police, in cooperation with the
telephone company, had been tapping telephone lines in New York despite an Act passed in 1895
prohibiting it.").
34. Admittedly, answering this Fourth Amendment question would not have been
dispositive of the issue, as the Supreme Court did not formally incorporate that amendment
against the states until 1961. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ('CThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.').
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After years of silence, the Court finally addressed this question
in Olmstead.36 There, seventy-two petitioners challenged their
convictions under the National Prohibition Act for transporting and
selling intoxicating liquor on grounds that federal agents had illegally
obtained evidence by monitoring their phone calls. 37 Petitioners
38
argued that these conversations were the equivalent of sealed letters
and that federal agents could not intercept them without first
obtaining a warrant. 39 The Court disagreed.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Taft argued that the
Fourth Amendment protects only "material things" and stated that
"[t]he amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use
of hearing and that only."40 The Constitution, in other words, could not
41
restrain the power of police to monitor private conversations.
Although the Court rejected petitioners' constitutional claim, it
emphasized in its holding that "Congress may, of course, protect the
secrecy of telephone messages ... by direct legislation, and thus
depart from the common law of evidence." 42 Six years later, Congress
accepted that invitation, enacting the Federal Communications Act of
1934 ("FCA"). 43 It provided, in relevant part, that "no person not being
authorized by the sender, shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence of contents, purport, effect or meaning
of such communication to any person."44 This language effectively
banned electronic surveillance by both private citizens and law
enforcement.

36. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
37. Id. at 456 ('CThe information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature
and extent was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators
by four federal prohibition officers.").
38. The Court had ruled in 1877 that police could not search or seize mailed letters without

first obtaining a warrant. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
39. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
40. Id.
41. The Court abandoned this narrow definition of "search" in its landmark Katz decision.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1968). In light of Katz, it is clear that electronic
surveillance is now considered a search under the Fourth Amendment, though the Court has
never directly addressed what constitutional-as compared to statutory-requirements exist for
such surveillance. But see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-59 (1967) (identifying features of
a New York state wiretapping statute that made it incompatible with the Fourth Amendment).
42. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-67.
43. Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 705, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 605).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Problem Not Solved: The Failureof the FCA and
the Enactment of Title III
By all appearances, the FCA should have resolved the
electronic surveillance problem once and for all. Assuming, as this
Note does, that Congress at the time supported the purist position, the
ban on electronic surveillance would appear to be a total victory,
particularly given the statute's unambiguous language. That
language, prohibiting all wiretaps, prevented the Court from watering
down the prohibition through interpretation. 45 So why did Congress
abandon the FCA in 1968, exchanging a clear-cut ban for a complexand arguably convoluted-system of regulation in Title III? What
happened during the intervening thirty-four years to convince
legislators that "the present state of the law is extremely
46
unsatisfactory"?
Two answers readily emerge. The first, somewhat surprisingly,
is organized crime.41 Though hardly a new problem in 1968,48
legislators at the time increasingly worried about "highly organized,
structured and formalized groups of criminal cartels, whose existence
transcends the crime known yesterday, for which our criminal laws
and procedures were primarily designed." 49 Spurred to action by the
release of the President's Crime Commission Report, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY,

Congress concluded that traditional law

enforcement techniques had failed to penetrate these "corporations of
corruption."50 New tools were needed, and wiretaps fit the bill.5 1
At the same time that law enforcement was clamoring for
greater investigatory power, privacy advocates were questioning
whether the FCA was truly the ban on wiretapping that Congress
intended it to be. 52 Professor Susan Freiwald has investigated this

45. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937) (upholding the Act against
a claim that the prohibition was not meant to apply to government agents).
46. S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154.
47. Id. at 2157 ('CThe major purpose of Title II is to combat organized crime.').
48. Congress itself conceded this point. See id. ("Ve have always had forms of organized
crime and corruption.").
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 801(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3711
("Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communications in their criminal
activities. The interception of such communications . . . is an indispensible aid to law
enforcement and the administration of justice.").
52. See S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 ("Both
proponents and opponents of wiretapping and electronic surveillance agree that the present state
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issue and concluded that government agents "conducted a significant
number of wiretapping investigations, even when it was illegal to do
so.''53 Law enforcement, in other words, "simply broke the law." 54 The
Justice Department was aware of these developments, but between
1934 and 1968 did not prosecute a single government agent, state or
federal, for violating the FCA. The agency thus signaled to law
enforcement that their agents could flaunt the wiretap ban with
impunity. 55 As Professor Freiwald noted, this disconnect between
theory and application helps to explain the fact that many
commentators actually viewed proposals to permit surveillance for the
first time as "opportunities to crack down on illegal wiretapping." 56 By
bringing the process out of the shadows, Congress could at least hope
to control its excesses.
C. The Shape of Things: The Structure of Title III and
the Birth of the Minimization Requirement
Having decided to relegalize police wiretaps, Congress faced
the daunting question of how to control them. 57 The answer it came up
with was Title III. 58 Because all subsequent surveillance laws in this
country developed, in some form or another, from this act, it is worth
pausing for a moment to explain its regulatory framework in some
detail.
The constraints set out in Title III fall into two categories:
(1) those that limit law enforcement's power to initiate a wiretap; and
(2) those that limit the ways in which agents may conduct the wiretap.
The first category of restraint arises from Title III's onerous
warrant requirement, which demands greater certainty and specificity

of the law in this area is extremely unsatisfactory and that Congress should act to clarify the
resulting confusion.").
53. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 33 (2004).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. It is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended for Title III to tightly
constrain the use of police wiretaps. See S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968

U.S.CC.A.N. 2112, 2153 ("[T]itle HI prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by
persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation or
prevention of specified types of serious crimes, and only after authorization of a court order
obtained after a showing and finding of probable cause.').
58. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. I1, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520).
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than a traditional search warrant. 59 An agent applying for wiretap
authorization must, for example, describe the place where the
communication is to be intercepted; 60 describe the type(s) of
communications to be intercepted; 61 establish probable cause to
believe that the target is engaged in a specific, enumerated criminal
offense; 62 and establish probable cause to believe that communications
relating to that particular offense will be obtained through the
surveillance. 63 Additionally, the agent must demonstrate that "normal
investigative techniques have been tried and have failed or reasonably
64
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Put
simply, Title III seeks to ensure that investigators know what they are
looking for prior to starting the surveillance and are not just engaging
in a fishing expedition.
Success in obtaining wiretap authorization does not mean the
agent is then free to conduct surveillance in whatever manner he sees
fit. The second category of Title III protections provides agents with
specific instructions, laying down ground rules for how surveillance
must proceed. In particular, it establishes the following:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to
intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception
terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or
under this chapter, and must
65
in any event in thirty days.

Just like the category one restrictions, these requirements are
meant to prevent government fishing expeditions. They force
government agents to conduct their surveillance within strict time
the surveillance will not become a new form of
limits-ensuring that
"general warrant"66-and
command the agents to "minimize" all
67
communications other than those they are authorized to intercept.

59.

§ 2518.

60.

§ 2518(1)(b)(ii).

61.

§ 2518(1)(b)(iii).

62. § 2518(3)(a).
63. § 2518(3)(b).
64. § 2518(3)(c).
65. § 2518(5) (emphasis added).
66. Congress appeared to take to heart Justice Brandeis's concern that "[als a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wire tapping." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
67. As noted in the introduction, the statute itself provides relatively little guidance on
what "minimization" should entail. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. Part II and IIl
of this Note will take up this question at much greater length.
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Finally, in support of these two categories, Title III establishes
several forms of redress for victims of illegal government surveillance,
including a right of civil action. 68 In some ways, this is the critical
difference between Title III and the FCA. As Professor Freiwald has
noted, the FCA had not clearly provided for civil claims, raising
serious questions about what would stop law enforcement from just
ignoring the statutory prohibition. 69 Title III, in contrast, explicitly
provides for a damage remedy, complete with attorneys' fees and,
where appropriate, punitive damages. 70 It also calls for suppression of
71
illegally obtained communications in any subsequent criminal trial.
By including such meaningful punitive provisions, Congress
sought to ensure that law enforcement would take the new law
seriously and would not simply return to the bad old days of strict-in72
theory but lax-in-practice surveillance.
The Supreme Court, however, had a different vision, at least as
applied to minimization.
D. Scott v. United States and the "Reasonableness"Requirement
In light of the terse language of the minimization
requirement 73 and the absence of any detailed legislative history, it
was only a matter of time before the Court provided its own
interpretation. Though law enforcement had to wait ten years for a
final judicial pronouncement on Title III,74 the Court finally took up

68. §§ 2515, 2520.
69. Freiwald, supra note 53, at 33.
70. § 2520(b)(2)-(3). The statute also provides specific instructions about how civil damages
should be calculated, instructing courts to award the greater of (1) "the sum of actual damages
suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator," or (2) "whichever is the greater of
$100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000." § 2520(c)(2).
71. § 2515 ("Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the

contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence
in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court....').
72. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of
Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CR1M. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 44 (1983) ("Title III's sponsors clearly
recognized that society's right to privacy would depend, in large part, upon this system of
statutory controls and that these controls, in turn, were dependent upon proper judicial
implementation.").
73. The only reference in Title HI to minimization is the command that the wiretap "shall
be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception under this chapter." § 2518(5).
74. Several lower courts had addressed the minimization requirement prior to Scott v.
United States, generally handling the requirement permissively. For an overview of these
decisions, see Goldsmith, supra note 72, at 104.
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the minimization question in 1978, when it decided Scott v. United
75
States.
The petitioners in Scott had been convicted of a conspiracy to
import and sell drugs in the Washington, D.C. area, based largely on
wiretap evidence.7 6 Petitioners appealed these convictions on the
ground that government agents had intercepted all of the phone
conversations over a particular line, despite judicial orders requiring
the agents to "minimize" nonpertinent calls.7 7 Petitioners argued that
such blatant disregard for personal privacy violated the minimization
requirement and warranted suppression of the evidence.
But the Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist rejected the idea of any bright-line minimization rule,
adopting instead a balancing test that "will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case."7 8 Taking this deference for law
enforcement even further, the majority suggested that it would not
necessarily matter whether the agents had deliberately ignored the
statutory requirement, so long as their conduct was "objectively"
reasonable. 79 And because the investigation in question concerned a
"widespread conspiracy," the Court concluded that it was perfectly
reasonable to conduct extensive surveillance-even to the point of
listening to all conversations on the target phone line.8 0 While this
permissive view of minimization was not quite a kiss of death for the
requirement, it did pave the way for a host of new exceptions from the
lower federal courts.8 1 As a result, subsequent commentators were not
wrong in arguing, in light of Scott and its progeny, that "the
'minimization requirement' imposes little in the way of additional
82
checks on the execution of an authorized wiretap."
E. Best-Laid Plans: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
Congress'sFailureto Keep Up with Changing Technologies
As previously noted, Congress passed Title III in 1968, roughly
a generation before the current "tech boom." As a result, the statute
75. 436 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1978).
76. Id. at 131.
77. Id. at 130-31.
78. Id. at 139-40.
79. Id. at 138 ('The fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.').
80. Id. at 140-41.
81. See infra Part II.E.
82. Downes, supra note 20, at 260.
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only governed interception of "wire communications"-defined by the
statute as "any communication made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and
the point of reception."8 3 Congress similarly defined "intercept" as the
"auralacquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication
84
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
These narrow definitions became more and more problematic
as technology advanced. Specifically, as law enforcement agencies
began intercepting new forms of communication, courts were
increasingly forced to determine whether such surveillance fell under
the aegis of Title III. For example, in United States v. Gregg the
Western District of Missouri faced the question of whether monitoring
telex messages constituted an "interception."8 5 Based on the narrow
statutory definition, the court concluded that it did not and that Title
III therefore provided no protection to the target.8 6 Similarly, in
United States v. Rose, the First Circuit concluded that Ham radio
broadcasts were not entitled to statutory protection.8 7 As cases like
these became more frequent, Congress concluded it was time for a
change: Title III would have to adapt to shifting technological realities
88
if it was going to continue protecting individual privacy.
To meet that challenge, Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986,
the first significant amendment in the history of Title 111.89 The Act's
most basic change was to the definition of "intercept," expanding the

83. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802(1), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)). The phrase "any communication" has
since been amended to read "any aural transfer." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006).
84. § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
85. United States v. Gregg, 629 F. Supp. 958, 961 (W.D. Mo. 1986). Telex machines were
precursors to modern fax machines.
86. Id. at 962 ("[Tlhis interception simply is not the type of 'aural acquisition' within the
purview of Title III. If Congress had intended for Title III to encompass all communications in
which the contents of the communications were intercepted, it would have said so.").
87. United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1982). Ham radio was, admittedly, a
well-established technology in 1968. However, it appears to have nonetheless been beyond the
contemplation of Congress.
88. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557 (' Title I of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act addresses the interception of wire, oral and
electronic communications. It amends existing chapter 119 of title 18 to bring it in line with
technological developments and changes in the structure of the telecommunications industry.").
89. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555 ('This bill amends the 1968 law to
update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new
computer and telecommunications technologies.").
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term to cover electronic as well as wire communications. 90 If the ECPA
had simply stopped there, it may have maintained a workable
regulatory framework. But Congress went further, making small but
important changes to how Title III would apply in the context of
nonwire intercepts. 9 1 The two changes relevant to this Note were to
the exclusionary remedy and the concept of minimization.
The first change-spelled out in ECPA § 101(e)-removed
statutory exclusionary relief for illegally intercepted electronic
communications. 92 The reasons for this change are not at all obvious
and appear to undermine Congress's stated intent that the ECPA
protect against "the unauthorized interception of electronic
communications." 93 The only explanation the Senate Report provided
was that the change was a result of "conversations with the Justice
Department,"94 suggesting that the arch-pragmatists in federal law
enforcement had influenced the drafting process.
The second and more important change was to Congress's
understanding of minimization itself.95 Although the ECPA did not
alter the basic language of Title III's minimization requirement, the
Senate Report emphasized that minimization of electronic
communications "would require a somewhat different procedure than
that used to minimize a telephone call."96 Expounding on this idea, the
report noted:
It is impossible to 'listen' to a computer and determine when to stop listening and
minimize as it is possible to do in listening to a telephone conversation. For instance, a
page displayed on a screen during a computer transmission might have five paragraphs
of which the second and third are relevant to the investigation and the others are not.
The printing technology is such that the whole page including the irrelevant paragraphs,
97
would have to be printed and read, before anything can be done about minimization.

Two critical points stand out from this statement. First is the
assertion that, in the context of electronic intercepts, minimization
90. ECPA of 1986 § 101(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4)).
91. §§ 101, 103; see also Freiwald, supra note 53, at 41-42 (providing a general overview of
the changes that the ECPA made to Title III).
92. § 101(e). The Senate Report on this section emphasizes that "[iun the event that there is
a violation of law of a constitutional magnitude, the court involved in a subsequent trial will
apply the existing Constitutional law with respect to the exclusionary rule." S. REP. No. 99-541,
at 23 (1986), reported in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577. It is not immediately clear, however,
exactly how the scope of Constitutional exclusion compares with that of Title III exclusion.
93. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577.
94. Id. at 23, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577.
95. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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should involve at least one government agent reviewing every
intercepted communication. 98 Second is the report's suggestion that
appropriate minimization is defined, at least in part, by the technology
available to law enforcement. In this respect, the Act's amorphous
notions of wiretap regulation in general, and minimization
requirements in particular, lend support to Professor Freiwald's
conclusion that "the ECPA's complexity has weakened its ability to
protect privacy."9 9
But how weak is it? How much less does it protect privacy
compared to the original Title III? Parts III and IV focus on these
questions, respectively.
III. PRYING EYES AND COMPLACENT COURTS: THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY'S UNWILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL
MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENTS

Having outlined the origins and current state of the
minimization requirement, the next question is, does it work? Given
Congress's goal of protecting privacy against modern, high-tech
surveillance, 100 does minimization advance that goal in any
meaningful way?
Unfortunately, the answer to that question is no. In light of the
relevant case law and federal surveillance statistics, 10 1 it is clear that
minimization provides no real privacy protection beyond that
10 2
contained in Title III's heightened warrant requirement.
The reasons for this failure are threefold. First, courtsfollowing the Supreme Court's lead in Scott-are overly deferential to
98. See id. ("[Minimization should be conducted by the initial law enforcement officials who
review the transcript. Those officials would delete all nonrelevant materials and disseminate to
other officials only that information which is relevant to the investigation.").
99. Freiwald, supra note 53, at 42.
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. One of the most useful sections of Title III is its reporting requirement, spelled out at
length in § 2519. That section requires:
In June of each year the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall transmit to the Congress a full and complete report concerning the
number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications pursuant to this chapter and the number of orders
and extensions granted or denied pursuant to this chapter during the preceding
calendar year.
18 U.S.C. § 2519(3) (2006). The federal judiciary makes these reports publicly available. At
present, federal Wiretap Reports for the years 1997-2009 are available at Wiretap Reports, U.S.
COURTS, http:/www.uscourts.gov/statistics/wiretapreports.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
102. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text; see also Downes, supra note 20, at 260
(explaining the rather minimal effect of the minimization requirement).
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law enforcement agencies. In practice, this often means that courts
take law enforcement agents at their word when they assert that they
have adequately minimized nonpertinent communications. Second, in
cases of electronic interceptions,1 0 3 courts interpret minimization so
loosely as to make it effectively worthless. Third, for most forms of
electronic communication, including text messages, government
agents can sidestep minimization altogether by performing other
types of surveillance that do not require "intercepting" the
0 4
communications.
A. Some Initial Clarification
Before diving into this analysis, a point of clarification is in
order concerning the underlying subject of this Note: minimization in
the context of text-message interceptions. By this point, skeptical or
curious readers may be wondering about the value of such a narrow
topic, particularly given the paucity of case law. 10 5 Why not address
minimization more generally, or at least expand the scope to cover
different forms of electronic communication?
The basic reason is that text messages are an interesting gray
area in modern surveillance law. Traditional wiretaps have gone on
for more than one hundred years 10 6 and have been subject to federal
regulation for more than forty years. The minimization requirement in
that context is well established and comparatively well defined. Cell
phones, though technologically different from landlines, are still a
form of oral communication, and therefore fit comfortably into the
existing minimization framework. At the other extreme, e-mail is
beyond the bounds of Title III and ECPA protection. 10 7 Law
enforcement typically obtains e-mail after it arrives in the recipient's
'08
inbox, which does not meet the legal definition of "interception."'
103. For the purposes of this analysis, "electronic interceptions" is defined broadly to include
the interception of all electronic forms of communication but does not include traditional
wiretaps.
104. § 2518(5) (stating that law enforcement must minimize "the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter') (emphasis added).
105. To date, research has not revealed a single federal case that directly addresses the
minimization of text messages.
106. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Individuals
generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers.... They may not,
however, enjoy such an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that
have already arrived at the recipient.").
108. Id.; see also Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir.
1994) ("[R]equirements applicable to the interception of electronic communications, such as those
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Text messages, to borrow from Goldilocks, are in this respect neither
"too hot" nor "too cold." They are "just right" for scholarly analysis
because Title III applies to them, but in ways that are not entirely
clear.
The other reason to focus on text-message minimization is that
it makes for a useful test case. Since the ECPA does not cover e-mail,
and cell-phone calls now fall under traditional Title III rules, 10 9 text
messages are the one major sphere of electronic communication where
minimization might still make a difference. In other words, if
minimization does not protect privacy in text messages, then it
probably has no value outside the traditional wiretap context.
B. Undue Deference: The Failureof Courts to Provide
Meaningful Oversight
When an individual claims that government agents have
violated the minimization requirement, the judicial response often
unfolds as follows:
Your Honor, the government has failed to take
Claimant:
reasonable steps to minimize nonpertinent
communications. Therefore, under Title III, the
evidence should be suppressed. 110
(To government) Is this true, counselor?
Judge:
Prosecutor: Not at all, your Honor. Look, the investigating
memo,
minimization
drafted
this
agents
nonpertinent
that
stating
specifically
communications should be minimized. And I
think we can all safely assume that the agents
followed their own procedures, can't we?
Judge:
Agreed. The defendant's motion to suppress is
hereby denied.
While this hypothetical is obvious hyperbole, it reflects one of
the basic problems of minimization, both for wire and electronic
communications. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Scott,
governing minimization, duration, and the types of crimes that may be investigated, are not
imposed when the communications at issue are not in the process of being transmitted at the
moment of seizure, but instead are in electronic storage.").
109. § 2516(1) (noting that federal judges may issue an order authorizing "the interception of
wire or oral communications") (emphasis added).
110. As noted in Part II, the ECPA does not provide for a suppression remedy for electronic
surveillance. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. However, a constitutional suppression
remedy may still be appropriate in some cases, and, even in a suit for damages, the same basic
framework would apply.
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judges tend to look at whether investigators developed minimization
procedures without giving much attention to whether the agents
actually followed them.
In United States v. Rivera, for example, drug traffickers
appealed their convictions on the grounds that DEA agents failed to
conduct reasonable minimization and indiscriminately labeled many
nonpertinent cell-phone calls as pertinent.1 11 In rejecting these claims,
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that "all agents working on the case and
all monitors were required to read [the supervising agent]'s affidavit,
the court order for the wiretap, and the minimization
memorandum."'' 12 The agents, of course, could easily have read and
then blatantly ignored those documents, but the court refused to
113
entertain that possibility.
Similarly, in United States v. Szpyt, a district court found the
government had met its initial burden of reasonable minimization by
demonstrating that it had trained its agents to respect the privacy of
privileged phone calls and had filed occasional reports regarding its
minimization efforts. 1 14 As in Rivera, however, the judge placed
greater emphasis on this plan than on its subsequent
implementation. 115
Moreover, federal agents do sometimes ignore internal
guidelines. In United States v. Renzi, FBI agents obtained a wiretap
order as part of their investigation into possible election law

111. 527 F.3d 891, 904 (9th Cir. 2008).
112. Id. A minimization memorandum is a document, often prepared by an Assistant U.S.
Attorney, explaining to law enforcement personnel the rules and procedures they must follow in
conducting electronic surveillance. See, e.g., id. at 905.
113. Id. at 904 ("It is apparent from the record that the DEA's monitoring procedures and its
training of the monitors were adequate.').
114. United States v. Szpyt, Criminal No. 08-54-P-S, 2008 WL 4840896, at *21 (D. Me. Nov.
9, 2008) ("Van Alstyne averred that minimization standards would be strictly followed, that
monitoring agents would be trained to implement such standards, including respect for the
privacy of innocent and privileged phone calls, and that the government would supply periodic
reports to the court touching, inter alia, on its minimization efforts. Similar procedures and
training have been deemed adequate in other cases.").
115. Id. at *22 (shifting the burden of proof to defendants to show that government agents
insufficiently or improperly minimized); see also United States v. Haque, 315 F. App'x 510, 519
(6th Cir. 2009) ("Special Agent Morgan testified that all persons involved in the instant
surveillance read the original minimization order and attended a briefing where the
minimization procedures were discussed. Additionally, two agents involved in the surveillance
were charged with seeing that the procedures were followed."). But see United States v. Mancari,
663 F. Supp. 1343, 1359 (N.D. M. 1987) (ordering further factfinding on an alleged minimization
violation and holding that government agents, despite their minimization memo, had failed to
make a prima facie showing of reasonableness).
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violations. 116 The supervising attorney drafted a memorandum
prohibiting agents from listening to or recording any calls subject to
attorney-client privilege. 117 But, as a magistrate judge later
determined, agents occasionally ignored the memo and recorded most
of the calls between the defendant and one of his attorneys-including
a number of privileged communications." 8 As a consequence, the court
excluded all of the government's wiretap evidence, concluding that the
government "conducted an unreasonable wholesale interception of
calls they knew to be attorney-client communications."' 9 On the one
hand, this case shows that government agents cannot always be
trusted to police their own wiretaps. On the other hand, it suggests
that at least some courts-unlike in Rivera and Szpyt-refuse to take
law enforcement claims at face value.
So which approach is more common: the broad deference of
Rivera and Szpyt, or the critical oversight of Renzi? In truth, it is hard
to know. The cases above are anecdotal and may reflect nothing more
than the proclivities of individual judges or districts. However, the
Federal Wiretap Reports suggest that deference to law enforcement is
the rule rather than the exception. 20 Though they present no specific
data regarding minimization, these reports show a consistent,
generalized pattern of deference to investigators at all stages of the
surveillance process. In 2007, for example, federal courts granted two
motions to suppress while denying ninety-eight.' 2' In 2006, the ratio
22
was one motion granted to thirty-one motions denied.'
This deference is even more pronounced at the front end of the
regulatory process. Between 1998 and 2008, federal agents submitted
5,870 intercept applications for approval. 23 The courts approved 5,866
of them. 2 4 That means that for the ten-year period, federal judges
rejected only .07% of all government surveillance requests.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

United States v. Renzi, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1107 (D. Ariz. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1107-08.
Id. at 1118.
See supra note 101.

121. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 WIRETAP REPORT 35 tbl.8 (2009) [hereinafter
2008 WIRETAP REPORT].

122. Id. at 34.
123. Id. at 32 tbl.7. Because of the organization of data in the table, it was not possible to
calculate this figure with absolute precision. However, the number of applications was no greater
than 5,870 nor less than 5,866.
124. Id.; see also Dempsey, supra note 6, at 76 (noting that between 1989 and 1995, no judge,
state or federal, denied a government request for electronic surveillance).
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The problem with affording such deference to investigators is
that it can encourage bad behavior. Absent a serious threat of judicial
rebuke, careless agents have less incentive to be careful and
unscrupulous agents have less incentive to behave ethically. And
while there is no evidence that the agents in Rivera or Szpyt were
behaving dishonestly or trying to deceive the courts, other agents
might. The minimization requirement, in this respect, provides little
protection against investigators willing to blatantly violate Title III
and their own minimization memos.
C. Defining Minimization Down: The ECPA and
Electronic Communications
Judicial deference is a problem for all minimization, both in the
wire and electronic contexts. But electronic communications present
additional problems and additional opportunities for investigatory
mischief. As the case law shows, minimization was simply not
designed for electronic communications such as text messages, and
attempts to expand minimization into the electronic realm have
produced odd, inconsistent, and generally unhelpful rules.
Although
courts have never
addressed text-message
minimization directly, 125 they have addressed minimization in some
similar settings, such as (1) pager intercepts 126 and (2) facsimile
intercepts.1 27 It is clear from these cases that courts, in reviewing
electronic intercepts, require investigators to observe the forms of
minimization while largely giving them a pass on the substance.
Minimization, as originally conceived, existed in the context of
aural interceptions--of government agents listening to target
conversations.1 28 Over time, courts came to understand minimization
as a temporal restriction, governing when and for how long
investigators could listen to phone calls. 129 As a result, courts

125. The closest research has come to unearthing a text-message intercept case is City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). The case did involve police officers monitoring text
messages but is only somewhat on point because it involved the retrieval of text messages from
electronic storage, rather than actual "interception." Id. at 2630.
126. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. David, 940 F.2d

722, 728-29 (lst Cir. 1991); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1990).
127. United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2002).
128. See supranotes 83-84 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) ('[Algents can hardly be
expected to know that... [very short calls] are not pertinent prior to their termination.").
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developed the "two-minute rule,"'130 which allows agents to listen to all
phone calls for at least two minutes to determine whether they are
relevant to the investigation. 131 This rule is now widely recognized and
in many districts is the starting point for any minimization
analysis.132 It is completely useless, however, in the context of
electronic communications.' 33 As a result, courts have been forced to
expand their definitions of minimization, usually without a clear
precedent to guide them. The results, as noted previously, have
preserved certain formal elements of minimization, but have rarely, if
ever, upheld its spirit.
So what types of minimization systems have courts developed?
The short answer is relatively few. One promising analogy is to pager
intercepts, since the technology, particularly on recent models, is not
so different from text messaging.134 Fifteen to twenty years ago, courts
were largely unwilling to extend Title III protection to pager
transmissions on the theory that they revealed only numbers, rather
than substantive communications. 35 But as pagers became more
advanced, judges recognized that the devices could, in fact, send
substantive messages. 36 As a consequence, several circuits now

130. See United States v. Segura, 318 F. App'x 706, 712 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Segura contends
that the government's two-minute instruction violates the minimization requirement. We
disagree."); United States v. Yarbrough, 527 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[C]onsistent with
Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, in analyzing the reasonableness of the
government's minimization efforts, we exclude calls under two minutes.").
131. Scott, 436 U.S. at 140.
132. See United States v. Olmedo, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ("Although
there is no bright-line rule as to how long an agent can listen to a call to determine whether it is
pertinent, many courts have approved two-minute and three-minute cutoffs as a reasonable
guide."); United States v. Borrayo-Gutierrez, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1184 (D. Colo. 2000) (finding
proper minimization when the supervising agent told monitors that "they could listen for
approximately two minutes and should disconnect at that point if the call did not appear to be
relevant to the investigation'); United States v. Wright, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1348 (D. Kan.
2000) ("[S]hort calls lasting less than two minutes are generally not scrutinized for
minimization.").
133. See Downes, supra note 20 ("Minimization as it has been understood up until now can
have no meaning in an increasingly digital world."),
134. See Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining how a criminal
defendant used alphanumeric codes sent via pager to communicate with drug dealers).
135. United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[A] digital display
pager, by its very nature, is nothing more than a contemporary receptacle for telephone
numbers."); see also United States v. Benjamin, 72 F. Supp. 2d 161, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)
("Paging devices, insofar as they reveal only numeric messages, but not the content of the
communication, are similar to pen registers permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).').
136. Brown, 50 F.3d at 287-88; see also United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 837 n.20
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[Numerical codes may be transmitted to a pager that impart messages to the
recipient.").
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explicitly hold that Title III protects pager communications. 1 37 They
have not, however, provided much guidance on how Title III protects
138
them, particularly in the minimization context.
One of the few courts to take up this question-albeit
39
tangentially-was the First Circuit in United States v. David.
Although it was primarily a case about minimizing foreign-language
conversations,' 40 David also addressed pager intercepts and
promulgated general rules about minimization in nontraditional
contexts.1 41 The court's basic command was that minimization-no
matter what the process-must "protect the suspect's privacy interests
to approximately the same extent as would contemporaneous
minimization, properly conducted."'142 In the context of foreignlanguage phone calls, the court interpreted this command as allowing
the government to record all of the conversations, and for translators
to then minimize them after the fact, transcribing only pertinent
portions for English-speaking agents. 43 Although the court only
addressed this process in the context of foreign-language calls, it
implicitly suggested that such procedures might apply more broadly,
noting that "[w]here intercepted conversations are in a foreign
language or code and, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, a
translator is not available for on-the-spot minimization, a different
44
rule obtains."'
Given the confusion that still exists concerning substantive
communications via pager, a better model may be facsimile
interception. 145 Research has revealed only one case addressing
minimization in that context, but that case addresses it at some length

137. Brown, 50 F.3d at 294; United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 728-29 (1st Cir. 1991).
138. Part of the problem is that courts have long recognized a minimization exemption for
"coded" transmissions. See United States v. Williams, 109 F.3d 502, 507 (8th Cir. 1997) ("The
remaining calls challenged by Williams were ambiguous in nature and included language the
agents reasonably could have believed was coded language referring to possible cocaine
transactions. More extensive wiretapping is reasonable when the conversations are in the jargon
of the drug trade.'). This exemption would presumably apply to all substantive, numeric pager
messages.
139. David, 940 F.2d at 728-29.
140. Id. at 729-30.
141. Id. at 727, 729.
142. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. With faxes, unlike with electronic pages, there is usually a substantive message and
therefore no real question that Title III and the minimization requirement apply.
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and provides the most plausible model for how investigators would
actually minimize text-message communications. 146
The defendants in United States v. McGuire were members of
the Montana Freemen, a radical militia devoted to setting up its own
government and financial system.147 McGuire and other militia
members printed and distributed thousands of fake checks, using
them as part of a scheme to over-pay debts and to cash the resulting
refunds. 148 Although these crimes were "white collar" in nature, the
FBI concluded that the group was well armed and capable of violence,
and therefore decided to investigate them surreptitiously via
49
surveillance of phone and fax communications. 1
In authorizing FBI monitoring, the supervising judge provided
a detailed statement on how the agents were to minimize fax
interceptions. 150 One investigator would be designated "monitoring
agent" and he, along with the Assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA"),
would review every fax, in its entirety, to determine whether it was
"pertinent to the criminal offenses listed in the court's order."'' 1 If so,
then the fax would be shared with the rest of the agents. If not, it
would be placed in a locked drawer until the interception order
expired, at which point it would be turned over to the authorizing
judge. 152 Although this procedure allowed one FBI agent and one
AUSA to view many nonpertinent communications, it did ensure that
"other people-government agents, lawyers, and others--did not read
1 53
the non-pertinent documents at all."'
The defendants argued that these procedures were inadequate,
154
as they did not truly "mimic those used for oral... interceptions."'
As a counterfactual, they suggested that the monitoring agent "should
have looked at each fax transmission with a ruler in hand, reading [it]
line by line."'155 Once it became apparent that the fax was

146. See United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining how
investigators actually minimize fax transmissions).
147. Id. at 1195. For background information on the militia and its various criminal
enterprises, see Tom Kenworthy & Serge F. Kovaleski, 'Freemen'Finally Taxed the Patience of
Federal Government, WASH. PosT, Mar. 31, 1996, at Al.
148. McGuire, 307 F.3d at 1195.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1200.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1201.
154. Id. at 1202.
155. Id.
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nonpertinent, the monitoring agent "should have skipped about thirty
156
lines and then continued," line-by-line, as before.
Faced with these two alternatives, the Ninth Circuit endorsed
the government's approach. 157 Echoing Scott, it emphasized that
minimization must be analyzed in light of the particular
circumstances, and that courts must strike a balance between
reducing "to a practical minimum the interception of conversations
unrelated to the criminal ... investigation" and "permitting the
government to pursue legitimate investigations."'5 8 But did McGuire
really get that balance right?
While it would certainly be inconvenient for an FBI agent,
ruler in hand, to read every fax transmission line-by-line, the Ninth
Circuit seems nonetheless to have misunderstood the true purpose of
the minimization requirement. Commentators from Justice Brennan
to the Senate Judiciary Committee have noted that the impetus
behind minimization was privacy protection, not due process
protection.' 59 In light of that fact, the Ninth Circuit did not-and
probably could not-explain why it would be meaningfully better for a
person to have one or two government agents monitoring his private
communications than it would be to have a team of half a dozen doing
the same. The McGuire Court claimed that it sought to reduce the
interception of nonpertinent communications to a "practical
minimum."1 60 But if its findings are indicative of how other courts
approach electronic intercepts, then a "practical minimum" will prove
to be no real minimum at all.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court favors this "in light of the
circumstances" approach to electronic communications. While the
Court has never taken an ECPA minimization case, it has recently
addressed the broad issue of text-message privacy in City of Ontario v.
Quon. There, a police department obtained transcripts of a SWAT
156. Id.
157. Id. ("we interpret Congress' 'common sense' idea of electronic minimization to mean
that law enforcement in some circumstances may look at every communication.").
158. Id. at 1199-1200.
159. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that the minimization requirement is a congressionally established safeguard "designed to
prevent Government electronic surveillance from becoming the abhorred general warrant which
historically had destroyed the cherished expectation of privacy in the home"); S. REP. No. 901097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 ('The tremendous scientific and
technological developments that have taken place in the last century have made possible today
the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these
developments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of
surveillance.").
160. McGuire, 307 F.3d at 1199-1200.
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sergeant's text messages to determine whether he had been
improperly using his office-issued pager. 161 An audit uncovered a
number of sexually explicit messages, leading the department to
launch a formal investigation into Quon's behavior. 162 Quon, in turn,
sued the department under the Secured Communications Act and the
Fourth Amendment for obtaining and reviewing his personal
63
communications. 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy assumed without
deciding that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in these
text messages.16 4 He further concluded, however, that the
department's review was reasonable in both purpose and scope 165 and
did not wrongfully intrude on Quon's privacy rights. This ruling is
the Ontario Police Department reviewed
notable because
in
much
the same way as the FBI had in McGuire.
communications
One officer read all of the transcripts, redacted irrelevant information,
166
and then passed the remaining records on to additional reviewers.
The Court ultimately found this approach to be reasonable because "it
was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon's
overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal
67

use."1

While it is important to emphasize that Quon, unlike McGuire,
dealt with an employee's privacy rights vis-A-vis his employer and was
not at all concerned with minimization, the factual similarities are
still striking. Based on this decision, together with the Court's
deferential holding in Scott, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
Court will endorse the Ninth Circuit's approach in McGuire if it ever
takes a text-message minimization case.
D. When Even a Quantum of ProtectionIs Too Much:
InvestigatoryAlternatives to Interception and Minimization
Having established that minimization provides no substantive
protection to text message privacy, the question remains whether it

161. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2626 (2010).

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2630 ("For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First,

Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to
him by the City.").
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2626.
167. Id. at 2631.
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provides any procedural protection. If government agents must
observe the formalities of minimization then their desire to avoid
procedural hassles might discourage them, at least at the margins,
from intercepting text messages in the first place. Might that
discouragement serve as a valuable privacy protection in its own
right?
The answer, unfortunately, is a resounding no. If government
agents want to avoid the hassles of minimization, trivial as they may
be, then those agents can typically do so with ease. There are many
ways for agents to obtain the contents of text messages without
intercepting them, and without interception Title III does not apply at
all. 168 In this respect, a critical failure of the minimization
requirement is that law enforcement can sidestep it so easily.
One of the ways for government agents to get around the
minimization requirement is by pulling text messages from electronic
storage rather than intercepting them directly. 169 Federal courts
170
analyzing this technique have held that Title III does not apply,
making it an attractive option for sidestepping the procedural
restrictions of electronic surveillance. Agents would still need to
obtain a warrant before demanding such records, but they would only
have to meet the normal warrant requirements of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the heightened requirements of Title 111.171 At
are
least one circuit has explicitly stated that stored communications
172
entitled to less protection than intercepted communications.
A second technique available to government agents is to search
the memory of a cell phone as part of a search incident to arrest. 173 In
a controversial 2007 decision, the Fifth Circuit ruled in United States
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006) (stating that law enforcement must "minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter")
(emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626 (describing how investigators at a California police
department contacted a wireless service provider to gain access to the contents of the text
messages sent or received from one of the city-owned pagers).
170. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Wiretap Act covers only "real-time interception of electronic communication"); United States v.
Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Congress did not intend for 'intercept' to apply to
'electronic communications' when those communications are in 'electronic storage.' ").
171. Stored Communications Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
172. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002) ('The level of
protection provided stored communications under the [Stored Communications Act] is
considerably less than that provided communications covered by the Wiretap Act.").
173. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254-55 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing the
warrantless seizure and search of a cell phone after suspect was arrested for methamphetamine
possession).
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v. Finley that cell phones are analogous to "containers"'174 and that
police can therefore search them without separate warrants after
arresting the owner. 175 In practice, that means that government
agents can read the text messages of any arrestee without performing
minimization, and can even arrest suspects for the specific purpose of
obtaining their text messages. 176 Of course, the value of this technique
may be limited, as it applies only when there has been a valid
arrest, 17 and only reveals the contents of messages physically saved
on the cell phone. However, to the extent law enforcement can find a
pretext to arrest their desired subject, the search-incident doctrine can
7
be a highly effective way to circumvent minimization.' 8
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the minimization
requirement provides no real protection to subjects of surveillance
unless the government files charges against them. 179 In United States
v. Dorfman, for example, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule "does not extend to a person
against whom no evidence is offered," and that nonparties therefore
have no standing to challenge the admission into evidence of
improperly minimized conversations."10 This loophole makes it easyat least in certain circumstances-for law enforcement to get around

174. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (holding that police have authority
to search containers-whether open or closed-that are within suspect's reach at the time he is
arrested).
175. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260.
176. Police would still need probable cause before they could make an arrest. They could,
however, arrest a suspect on the pretext of some minor felony in order to gain access to his cell
phone during the search incident to arrest. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(noting that the constitutional "reasonableness" of an arrest does not depend on the "actual
motivations of the individual officers involved").
177. Finley, 477 F.3d at 259-60 (emphasizing that the search of suspect's text messages was
valid because it was part of a search incident to arrest).
178. Another limitation is the fact that the Finley approach to text-message searches
remains controversial and has been explicitly rejected in several jurisdictions. See United States
v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) ('The Court
declines to adopt the reasoning of Finley and extend law to provide an exception to the warrant
requirement for searches of cell phones."); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI., 2007 WL
1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (distinguishing pagers from cell phones and finding that
the contents of the latter are protected by the Fourth Amendment); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d
949, 956 (Ohio 2009) ("We hold that the warrantless search of data within a cell phone seized
incident to valid arrest is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment when the search is unnecessary
for the safety of law-enforcement officers and there are no exigent circumstances.").
179. United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1982).
180. Id.
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the minimization requirement. All they have to do is intercept the
communications of a non-suspect third party. 181
Based on the availability of these three techniques, government
agents can sidestep even the hollowed-out minimization requirements
for electronic interceptions if and when they determine those
requirements to be too much of a nuisance.
IV.GLIMMERS OF TRUE PROTECTION: WHY THE "TRADITIONAL"
MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENT AFFORDS MORE PRIVACY PROTECTION
THAN THE ECPA VERSION

Minimization has failed as a form of privacy protection; the
question is, how badly? Has it failed only in the context of electronic
intercepts, or is "traditional" minimization every bit as flawed? The
question might seem academic, but it is, in fact, critical to the broader
analysis. Fixing a problem, after all, requires some understanding of
what is broken. Is it electronic minimization, or minimization
generally?
Critics of the current system argue that minimization as a
whole has simply fallen short. 182 Case law seems to support this claim,
as exceptions to minimization have grown so large and so numerous
that they have arguably swallowed up the rule. Courts have held, for
example, that government agents possess broader intercept powers
while investigating "a wide-ranging conspiracy with large numbers of
participants."'18 3 They have similarly ruled that agents may lawfully
84
listen in on private calls during the early stages of an investigation,
and when the calls are in coded or ambiguous language. 185 And, of
course, these specific exceptions fall on top of the deferential holding

181. As an example, if the police were seeking to obtain evidence to use against a suspected
drug dealer, they could obtain a surveillance warrant for his mother or girlfriend rather than the
suspect himself. If the police then violated the minimization requirement, no one would have
standing to suppress the improperly minimized messages.
Admittedly, Title Ill also establishes a civil remedy for victims of improper minimization. 18
U.S.C. § 2520 (2006). However, this section fully exempts federal agents and contains a broad
"good faith" exception for state law enforcement. Id. §§ 2510(5)(a)(ii), 2520(a). In practice, this
means that civil recovery is almost never possible. For a detailed analysis of the law enforcement
exception, see Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1999).
182. See Dempsey, supra note 6, at 77 ("[The lower courts have read [the Scott decision] as
effectively eliminating the requirement to minimize the recording of innocent conversations.").
183. United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000).
184. United States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 1989).
185. United States v. Williams, 109 F.3d 502, 507 (8th Cir. 1997).
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from Scott, which requires only that minimization efforts be
86
objectively "reasonable."'
Despite
these
loopholes
and
exceptions,
traditional
minimization still provides real privacy protection, at least in some
circumstances.18 7 Compared to electronic minimization, which courts
have thoroughly gutted, wiretap minimization continues to affect the
way in which law enforcement conducts surveillance. Its continued, if
partial, vitality can be attributed to three underlying factors. First,
the statute governing traditional minimization makes it easier for
victims to seek redress. Second, courts have been more willing to grant
motions to suppress in the wiretap context. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, law enforcement agencies have internalized wiretap
minimization standards in a way they simply have not done for ECPA
minimization standards.
A. The Stronger the Statute, the Stronger the Protection
Although electronic and wiretap minimization are both
governed by Title III, there are small but significant differences in the
protections they provide.18 8 The most important of these differences is
that the original Title III established suppression as a remedy for
inadequate minimization, 8 9 while the ECPA refused to extend the
same protection to electronic communications. 190 The Fourth
Amendment, of course, may provide its own suppression remedy,
independent of any statute. 191 As a result, failure to minimize
186. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978).
187. Courts have traditionally been most concerned about privacy in the contexts of
attorney-client and marital communications. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299,
1307 (1st Cir. 1987) (suppressing twenty-two calls between an attorney and client and holding
that the government failed to minimize); United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. 1343, 1359
(N.D. Ill. 1987) ("[he court is concerned that interception between [the defendant] and his wife
appears to have continued beyond the period of the first authorization order despite the
government's failure to list her in the extension application.").
188. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006) ("Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court .... ).
190. ECPA of 1986 § 101(e), 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) (stating that civil damages and sanctions
are "the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter
involving such communications").
191. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (holding the exclusion doctrine to be
"constitutionally necessary"). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have called the constitutional
status of the exclusionary rule into question. See generally INS. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984) (holding that the "exclusionary rule would not apply in civil deportation hearing to require
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electronic communications may still be grounds for suppression. 9 2 The
Senate recognized this possibility, noting in its report on the ECPA
that "[i]n the event that there is a violation of law of a constitutional
magnitude, the court involved in a subsequent trial will apply the
193
existing [c]onstitutional law with respect to the exclusionary rule."
The reality, however, is that no court has ever construed a particular
failure to minimize as a constitutional violation. 194 Assuming this
trend continues, the ECPA minimization requirement contains no true
enforcement mechanism. In contrast, the original Title III
requirement continues to protect the contents of phone calls through
its statutory suppression remedy.
B. Judges Do Sometimes Grant Motions to Suppress in the
TraditionalWiretap Context
It is all well and good that Title III contains a suppression
remedy, but questions remain as to how much protection that remedy
provides. Critics of the current minimization system argue that the
protection is illusory, as judges rarely, if ever, find government
minimization efforts unreasonable. 1 95 And without a finding of
violation, questions of remedy are simply irrelevant.
The fact remains, however, that courts have found
minimization violations and have suppressed conversations as a
result. In United States v. Hoffman, for example, the First Circuit
suppressed twenty-two phone calls between a defendant and her
attorney, noting that "the agents should have stopped listening to

that admission of illegal entry by alien after allegedly unlawful arrest be excluded from
evidence."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to extend the exclusionary
rule to grand jury proceedings). To date, the Court has not definitively resolved this issue.
192. Professor Goldsmith, for example, has argued that the minimization requirement is
itself constitutional, rather than statutory, in origin and that a failure to minimize should
therefore be treated in the same basic way as any other due process violation-which in most
circumstances means exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. Goldsmith, supra note 72, at 98.
193. S.REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577.
194. Professor Freiwald investigated this issue in the particular context of e-mail
interceptions, noting that a few cases "suggest in dicta that the Fourth Amendment protects the
contents of e-mail, but none has granted a suppression remedy to a victim of an unauthorized email interception." Freiwald, supra note 53, at 53. Admittedly, e-mail intercepts may not raise
the exact same issues as text-message intercepts. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
Research, however, has not revealed any examples of courts extending any greater constitutional
protection to the contents of text messages.
195. See Dempsey, supra note 6, at 77 ("Defendants' after-the-fact challenges to the
authorization or conduct of surveillance are rarely sustained. Between 1985 and 1994, judges
nationwide granted 138 suppression motions while denying 3,060, for a 4.3% suppression rate.').
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each call as soon as the parties were identified."196 More recently, in
United States v. Simels, the Eastern District of New York suppressed
all of the conversations obtained during a wiretap, as agents in that
case had recorded conversations without contemporaneously
minimizing them. 197 The government argued it had not violated the
statute, as only one agent had listened to the unedited tapes. But the
court flatly rejected that argument. 198 Delivering an unusually strong
rebuke, it declared, "'When the government deliberately intercepts
nonpertinent communications, it is no comfort to those whose privacy
has been invaded that only government actors not involved in a
particular criminal investigation will be listening to them."' 99 The
Simels decision, in turn, influenced the District of Arizona's reasoning
in United States v. Renzi, which excluded all of the government's
20 0
wiretap evidence because of a failure to minimize properly.
A few courts have even reprimanded government agents for
failing to make
a prima facie showing that their minimization was
"reasonable." 20 ' For example, in United States v. Mancari the
Northern District of Illinois rejected the government's claim that
submission of status reports to a judge was sufficient proof of
reasonableness. 20 2 In particular, the court emphasized its concern that
agents may have violated their own minimization guidelines and that
the status reports failed to address that concern. 20 3 As noted above,
skeptical judicial review of minimization is more likely the exception
than the rule. Occasional scrutiny, however, is better than consistent
and predictable laxity.
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that the minimization
requirement still has teeth in the wiretap context. Though it is
difficult to determine how often suppression takes place, 20 4 judicial
rebukes-even infrequent ones-may help deter law-enforcement
misconduct. At the very least, they establish that government agents
196. United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1307 (1st Cir. 1987).
197. United States v. Simels, No. 08-CR-640 (JG), 2009 WL 1924746, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. July
2, 2009).
198. Id. at *11.
199. Id.
200. United States v. Renzi, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1128 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citing Simels for the
proposition that agents do not properly minimize calls by recording all communications and then
sorting them out later).
201. United States v. Mancari, 663 F. Supp. 1343, 1359 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The yearly Wiretap Reports are of little help in answering this question, as they do not
distinguish between different types of suppression motions.
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cannot flaunt Title III with impunity. In contrast, the ECPA
minimization requirement fails to provide even that basic level of
protection.
C. Law Enforcement Agencies Have PartiallyInternalized the
TraditionalMinimization Requirement
Law enforcement agencies have been living with Title III for
more than four decades and have largely accepted its underlying
restrictions. They have adapted to the statute through training and
internal policymaking, and have at times placed tighter restrictions on
themselves than the statutory language places on them. In United
States v. Rivera, for example, a DEA taskforce developed detailed
internal regulations to help guide agents in their surveillance. 20 5 The
regulations required that new monitors be paired with experienced
monitors to ensure that they minimized properly, and that scheduled
surveillance shifts overlap, so that outgoing monitors could share
information on intercepted calls with the incoming monitors. 20 6 In
light of the Scott decision, where the Supreme Court upheld as
"reasonable" a wiretap in which the agents performed no minimization
at all, 20 7 it does not appear that any of these policies were required by
208
law.
Similarly, in United States v. David, the DEA demonstrated
how its agents had gone beyond their legal obligations in minimizing
foreign-language communications. 20 9 The agents in that case had been
monitoring Hebrew-language phone calls as part of an investigation
into international drug smuggling. 210 Because the task force did not
include, and could not immediately locate, any Hebrew-speaking
agents, they recorded the conversations and then turned the tapes
over to translators. 211 Critically, however, the DEA required the
translators to treat the tapes like live communications and
immediately stop listening once it became clear that a conversation

205. United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 904 (9th Cir. 2008).
206. Id. at 905.
207. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1978).
208. For a comparable example of a federal agency applying stringent internal minimization
policies, see United States v. Haque, 315 F. App'x 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing an FBI
wiretap memo that required all monitoring agents to attend initial training, and for two senior
agents to oversee the monitoring at all times).
209. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 730 (1st Cir. 1991).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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was beyond the scope of the investigation. 212 As a result, no one on the
task force listened to the nonpertinent communications.
Evidence strongly suggests that the First Circuit in David
would have approved a much lower level of minimization. In its
analysis, the court approvingly cited United States v. Gambino, a case
from the Southern District of New York involving similar facts. 2 13 In
Gambino, however, the FBI conducted minimization differently,
allowing Sicilian-speaking agents to listen to all recorded
conversations and then to transcribe and pass along only those
pertinent to the investigation. 2 14 Unlike the agents in David, the FBI
allowed certain investigators to listen in on all of the private,
nonpertinent conversations. 215 If the DEA had wanted to, it could
probably have gotten away with a similar minimization scheme. But,
because of the task force's internal policies, the agents protected the
privacy of their surveillance target more than either the statute or
court required.
The underlying point here is not that government agents are
always concerned with the privacy rights of their surveillance targets.
If anything, exceptions to minimization for which agencies have
fought-and usually won--over the years establish just the
opposite. 21 6 But what these cases show is that government agents
have internalized certain basic requirements of minimization. For all
of the exceptions that exist at the periphery, agents have largely
accepted that there is a core of private, nonpertinent conversation that
law enforcement simply may not access. In contrast, government
agents do not appear to view electronic communications as warranting
217
any true privacy protection.
The differences between traditional and ECPA minimization
show the latter to be truly broken, while the former is flawed but
functional. The evidence shows that the current wiretap framework

212. Id.
213. Id. (citing United States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
214. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. at 1106.
215. As noted earlier, permitting a single monitoring agent-rather than multiple
monitoring agents-to access an individual's private communications is, at best, a flimsy form of
privacy protection. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (accepting
government argument that there is no right to privacy in e-mails). Admittedly, the FBI
demonstrated some limited interest in individual privacy rights in United States v. McGuire, 307
F.3d 1192, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002). But, even in that case, the FBI permitted one of its
agents-along with the assistant U.S. Attorney-to read through nonminimized fax
transmissions in their entirety. Id. at 1200.
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successfully protects some level of personal privacy, and therefore
should not be discarded. 218 The ECPA minimization requirement, on
the other hand, is worthless, providing no true privacy protection for
electronic communications.
The question, then, is how do we fix it? Or, at a more basic
level, is it even worth fixing?
V. A TEMPEST IN A TEXT MESSAGE: SHOULD WE CARE THAT
MINIMIZATION DOES NOT PROTECT ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
AND, IF SO, WHAT SHOULD WE Do ABOUT IT?

Minimization fails when applied-or not applied, as the case
may be-to electronic communications. But why should that fact
concern us? Why does minimization even matter, particularly if it
requires us to limit the power of police to investigate major crimes?
Scholars and jurists have debated this question for more than
eighty years, with some pushing for privacy purity and others arguing
for a more pragmatic approach. 219 After careful analysis, it is clear
that the pragmatists have the better argument. 220 Minimization arose
from the world of telephone wiretaps, and attempts to extend it have
proven useless at best, counterproductive at worst. Rather than
struggle to modify minimization in some vain attempt to keep up with
technology, we should simply concede that the experiment has failed
and should end it.

218. I am sympathetic in particular to the argument that judges should put more weight on
the percentage of calls improperly intercepted, and should suppress all conversations in cases
where the government brazenly disregards the minimization requirement. See, e.g., Ronni L.

Mann, Note, Minimization of Wire Interception: PresearchGuidelines and Postsearch Remedies,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1437-38 (1974) (arguing that courts should suppress all conversations
when the government's violation of the minimization requirement is "substantial").
219. Compare Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that allowing for electronic surveillance is like "placing a policeman in every home or
office where it was shown that there was probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime
would be obtained), with id. at 72 (Black., J., dissenting) (focusing on the fact that "[c]riminals
are shrewd and constantly seek, too often successfully, to conceal their tracks and their outlawry
from law officers").
220. As explained in Part III, this Note does not advocate the wholesale abandonment of the
minimization requirement, as it continues to provide useful-if limited-privacy protection in
the context of wire surveillance.
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A. The PuristApproach
Privacy purists believe that people have a basic right to be "let
alone."22 1 In 1928, in his famous Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis
turned this belief into a personal cri-de-coeur, arguing that the
Founders recognized "the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect" and that they intended "to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations." 222 In erecting this intellectual redoubt, which Justices
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Brennan would later defend, 2 23 Brandeis
emphasized that privacy is more than just a due process concern.
While he and other purists recognized the due process implications of
unrestrained government surveillance, 224 their concern was a deeper
one. 225 As purists saw the world, individual freedom was impossible
226
without a private sphere free from state oversight and intervention.
And as new technologies threatened to knock down those sanctum
walls, purists saw an immediate need for courts to step in with
supplemental legal protection.
Another defining feature of the purists is their general
disinterest in the needs of law enforcement. 227 To the purist, privacy is
a fundamental right, not something to balance against the ebb and
221. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("A discreet selective wiretap or
electronic 'hugging' is of course not rummaging around, collecting everything in a particular time
and space zone. But even though it is limited in time, it is the greatest of all invasions of
privacy."); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Electronic
surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the most
effective tools of tyranny."); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ('Loose talk about war against crime too easily infuses the administration of justice
with the psychology and morals of war.").
224. See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the
rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.").
225. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 66 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Whether or not the evidence
obtained is used at a trial for another crime, the privacy of the individual has been infringed by
the interception of all of his conversation."); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
('The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.").
226. See, e.g., Lopez, 373 U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In a free society, people
ought not to have to watch their every word so carefully.").
227. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 758 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Of course criminal
prosecution is more than a game. But in any event it should not be deemed to be a dirty game in
which 'the dirty business' of criminals is outwitted by 'the dirty business' of law officers.");
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("And it is also immaterial that the intrusion
was in aid of law enforcement.").
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flow of governmental demands. 228 Those demands, after all, just grow
larger and larger with time, leading to a steady erosion of personal
privacy. 229 In his Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis suggested that
well-intentioned privacy violations could actually threaten liberty
more than malicious ones, 230 as individuals can spot and resist
encroachments from "evil-minded rulers," but are highly vulnerable to
"insidious encroachment[s]" in the name of the common good. 231 The
public does not really care about the privacy rights of mobsters and
drug-dealers. But once the public acquiesces to one privacy violation,
it becomes easier for the government to engage in others. 232 For the
purists, this long-term risk is simply unacceptable.
So what does this all mean in the context of electronic
minimization? For purists like Brandeis and Brennan, the answer is
simple. Text messages and e-mail exist within the same sphere of
privacy as phone calls and should remain beyond the reach of law
enforcement. 233 The minimization requirement, in other words, should
expand to exempt all private electronic communications from
surveillance.
Of course, in light of Scott's reasonableness requirement, such
dramatic change is unlikely. Modern scholars, however, have
suggested several purist alternatives that would strengthen
minimization without prohibiting electronic intercepts. 234 Professor

228. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ('CThat
there is a zone that no police can enter-whether in 'hot pursuit' or armed with a meticulously
proper warrant-has been emphasized by Boyd and by Gouled.").
229. Cf. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the police
traditionally engage in some rather disreputable practices of law enforcement is no argument for

their extension.").
230. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
231. Id.
232. This phenomenon calls to mind the saying-often attributed to H.L. Mencken-that
"the trouble with fighting for human freedom is that one spends most of one's time defending
scoundrels. For it is against scoundrels that oppressive laws are first aimed, and oppression
must be stopped at the beginning if it is to be stopped at all."
233. Of course, the main purist justices-Brandeis, Frankfurter, Brennan, and Douglas-were active prior to the modern tech boom, so any conclusions about their views on e-mail or text
message privacy involves a degree of speculation. However, given their absolutist position
against wiretaps, it is not too much of a leap to think that they would favor similar protections
for these newer forms of communication. The arguments against wiretapping apply with equal
force against electronic intercepts, particularly because an electronic intercept also "intrudes
upon the privacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate of
conversations." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
234. As a practical matter, many of these minimization "fixes" could apply to both wiretaps
and electronic intercepts. This is consistent with the purist view that phone calls, as well as emails and text-messages, should receive greater privacy protection than they currently do. See,
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James Dempsey, for example, has proposed a technological solution,
noting that it may become "relatively easy for the service provider to
perform the minimization." 235 Courts could then require such
minimization as part of their reasonableness analysis under Scott.
Ronni Mann, in turn, has suggested that courts suppress all
intercepted communications in cases where law enforcement
inadequately minimizes more than some set percentage of
messages. 236 And-though no purist has actually proposed this
approach-courts could force the government to adopt the appellee's
position in United States v. McGuire, printing out messages and
237
performing minimization on a line-by-line basis.
B. The PragmatistApproach
If purists tremble at the prospect of the too-strong state,
pragmatists fear the opposite: a state unable to defend its citizens. In
1967, for example, the Johnson Administration released its landmark
report, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY. Striking a
pessimistic tone, the Presidential Commission conceded that "[s]ome
have become distrustful of the Government's ability, or even desire, to
protect them. ' 238 Turning specifically to the problem of organized
crime, the Commission stated bluntly that attempts to control it "have
not been successful."239 These findings proved influential in Congress,
leading legislators to agree that wiretapping had become
240
"indispensable" for combating certain crimes.
Justice Black voiced similar concerns in his Berger dissent. He
noted that "this country is painfully realizing that evidence of crime is
difficult for governments to secure. Criminals are shrewd and
constantly seek, too often successfully, to conceal their tracks and
their outlawry from law officers." 241 Even the Senate, which had
e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 72, at 106-07 (criticizing the Scott Court for failing to "rectify the
consequences of its prior neglect).
235. Dempsey, supra note 6, at 87.
236. See Mann, supra note 218, at 1438 ("If, in the court's opinion, substantial compliance
has not occurred, [then] the proper remedy is suppression of the entire wiretap.").
237. 307 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002).
238. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF

CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

1 (1967)

[hereinafter

CHALLENGE OF CRIME],

available at

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
239. Id. at 198.
240. S. REP NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2161 ("[A]uthorized
wiretapping and electronic surveillance techniques by law enforcement officials are
indispensable legal tools.').
241. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 72 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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traditionally been more privacy-conscious than the Court, emphasized
the country's growing crime problem in its report on Title 111.242 In
particular, it noted that traditional police techniques had proven
"notably unsuccessful" in combating the rise of criminal cartels. 24 3
Pragmatists, in this respect, view the purist position as well
intentioned but misguided. 244 Government agents may violate one's
privacy, but they are "assuredly not engaged in a more 'ignoble' or
'dirty business' than are bribers, thieves, burglars, robbers, rapists,
'245
kidnappers, and murderers.
The crux of this pragmatist argument is that government
endangers society's interests by providing too much privacy protection,
rather than too little. Justice Rehnquist made this point in Scott,
emphasizing that the public is ill served by "inflexible" restrictions on
law enforcement. 246 Police, he reasoned, must have the freedom to
adapt to changing circumstances, even when the consequence is more
extensive surveillance. 24 7 Lower courts have largely embraced this
understanding. For example, in 1971, seven years before the Scott
decision, the Southern District of California declared that "the
imposition of a rigid set of rules might in diverse situations serve to
thwart the very purposes of the [minimization] statute. ' 24 In United
States v. Yarbrough, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
similarly concluded that "[iun light of the extensive nature of the
criminal investigation.., agents were entitled to more leeway in
monitoring calls. '249 Pragmatists therefore reject the idea of brightline privacy rules. When benefits are slight and costs to law
enforcement are high, privacy protection must give way to the needs of
250
law and order.
242. S. REP No. 90-1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157-58.
243. Id. at 2157.
244. Cf. Leon Jaworski et al., Additional Views of Individual Commission Members, in
CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supranote 238, at 678-79 ("We are passing through a phase in our history
But the
of understandable, yet unprecedented, concern with the rights of accused persons ....
time has come for a like concern for the rights of citizens to be free from criminal molestation of
their persons and property.").
245. Berger, 388 U.S. at 72-73 (Black, J., dissenting).
246. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
247. Id. at 140 ("In determining whether the agents properly minimized, it is also important
to consider the circumstances of the wiretap.').
248. United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 538 (S.D. Cal. 1971), affd in part, rev'd in part,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
249. 527 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 2008).
250. See, e.g., Berger, 388 U.S. at 72-73 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that in dealing with
criminals "eavesdroppers are not merely useful, they are frequently a necessity); see also
Jaworski et al., supra note 244, at 307 ("In many respects, the victims of crime have been the
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Under this framework, statutory checks on police power are
justifiable only when the clear, quantifiable benefit outweighs the loss
in investigatory effectiveness; small or symbolic privacy protections
are downplayed or discounted. Courts taking this approach have
routinely held that minor failures to minimize are not true violations
at all. 251 In McGuire, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the incremental
privacy benefit of preventing all FBI agents from reading
nonpertinent faxes-rather than allowing one agent to read them--did
not justify burdening the investigators. 252 While pragmatists have not
always come down on the side of law enforcement, 253 they have shown
that they will generally defer to police interests unless substantial
privacy rights are involved.
Given the utter failure of the ECPA minimization requirement,
pragmatists favor discarding it. On the one hand, it provides no
meaningful privacy protection, 254 while on the other hand, it burdens
law enforcement.
C. Resolution: A Grudging Concession to Pragmatism
So who has the better of the arguments: purists or
pragmatists? Purists certainly win the battle of words, framing the
privacy debate as a twilight struggle between the forces of liberty and
unwitting harbingers of tyranny. 255 But rhetoric is no substitute for
evidence, and in the narrow context of electronic minimization,
evidence is on the pragmatists' side. Though purists are right to worry
forgotten men of our society-inadequately protected, generally uncompensated, and the object of
relatively little attention by the public at large.").
251. See United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Even assuming the
government improperly intercepted all 267 [of 7322] calls as the appellants assert, this was only
3.65% of the total number of calls intercepted. Such a percentage alone is not fatal."); United
States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 1989) (calculating that the police had minimized
only seventy percent of nonpertinent calls, but concluding that there was "nothing which
indicates that these statistics are anything short of reasonable").
252. United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Minimization requires
that the government adopt reasonable measures to reduce to a practical minimum the
interception of conversations unrelated to the criminal activity under investigation while
permitting the government to pursue legitimate investigation.") (emphasis added).
253. Berger, 388 U.S. at 63 (noting the government's claimed interest in crime prevention,
but nonetheless concluding that "it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply
with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one's home or
office are invaded").
254. See supraPart I.
255. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience is one of
the most effective tools of tyranny.").
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about government invasions of personal privacy, their arguments visa-vis minimization (1) overstate the slippery slope effect; (2) fail to
situate electronic intercepts within the broader universe of police
investigation; and (3) overlook the possibility that rules governing
actually undermine wiretap
electronic minimization could
minimization. Congress should therefore amend Title III to abolish
the electronic minimization requirement, recognizing that a flawed
protection is sometimes worse than no protection at all.
1. Numbers Matter
From the dissenting opinions of purist justices, it is clear that
the bogeyman haunting their dreams was the all-seeing government
agent. 256 More than eighty years after Brandeis's Olmstead dissent,
those omniscient agents have still not appeared. We know, for
instance, that law enforcement performs very few electronic intercepts
under Title III-no more than thirty-six in 2009 and forty-three in
2008.257 The number of traditional wiretaps, though larger, is still
relatively modest-1,720 for 2009 and 1,757 for 2008.258 With a

national population during those years of roughly 307,000,000,259 that
means that in 2009, government agents conducted Title III wire
surveillance against roughly one American in every 174,829.260

On the other side of the balance, data strongly suggest that
these surveillance operations lead to actual arrests, generally for
serious crimes such as drug trafficking. 261 In 2008, for example, 1,809
256. See, e.g., Berger, 388 U.S. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring) (likening electronic
surveillance to placing "an invisible policeman in the home"); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.").
257. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 WIRETAP REPORT 28 tbl.6 (2010) [hereinafter
2009 WIRETAP REPORT]; 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 121, at 28 tbl.6. These figures are the
sum of "electronic" and "combination" intercepts performed during the relevant year.
258. 2009 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 257, at 28 tbl.6; 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note
121, at 28 tbl.6.
259. Based on the 2009 U.S. Census Bureau estimate of 307,006,550. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2000-2009, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/
NST-ann-est.html.
260. This number is the result of dividing the rounded U.S. population by the total number
of wire, electronic, and combined wiretaps performed in 2009. It is worth noting, however, that
this figure does not reflect surveillance performed under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act ("FISA") or any other domestic security program, as such surveillance is governed by
different laws and is beyond the scope of this analysis.
261. In 2008, for example, 1,593 of 1,891 total authorized wiretaps-a little more than
eighty-four percent-were for narcotics offenses. 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 121, at 18
tbl.3.
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total surveillance operations resulted in 4,133 arrests. 262 And based on
past statistics, roughly forty percent to fifty-five percent of those
263
arrested will ultimately be convicted.
The critical point here is that the choice of whether to adopt
the purists' bright-line test or the pragmatists' balancing test requires
a balancing test of its own. A bright-line rule might be appropriate if
the actual threat to liberty were fundamental and imminent. But, as
264
the data show, we are not living in a nightmarish panopticon now,
and do not seem to be headed for one anytime soon. In 1967, Justice
Douglas warned that allowing electronic surveillance would be the
265
equivalent of putting an invisible police officer into every home.
That, indeed, would be a terrifying result. The reality, however, is that
electronic surveillance has put an invisible police officer into only a
tiny fraction of U.S. homes-usually those where serious crimes are
taking place. 266 Under the circumstances, it is reasonable for citizens
to make limited privacy concessions for the sake of police
effectiveness. And because electronic minimization has been
unsuccessful as a privacy protection, the concession turns out to be a
small one.
2. Minimization Law Contains Too Many Loopholes
The second strike against the purist position is that even a
strengthened minimization requirement would not meaningfully
protect individual privacy. There are, quite simply, too many ways for
law enforcement to circumvent it, foregoing Title III surveillance
267
altogether in favor of other investigative techniques.
At first glance, this outcome might appear satisfactory. If
government agents can get the evidence they need and private citizens
can avoid becoming targets of electronic surveillance, then where is
262. 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 121, at 26 tbl.6.
263. 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supranote 121, at 38 tbl.9.
264. The term "Panopticon" was first used by Jeremy Bentham to describe a model prison in
which prisoners would come to believe that they were under constant surveillance and would,
over time, alter their behavior in response. This idea, in turn, became the basis for Michel
Foucault's concept of Panopticism-a system of societal control that induces individuals to
internalize particular behaviors through constant observation and correction. See MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195-228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(1977).
265. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64-65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
266. One explanation for why electronic surveillance has remained a relatively uncommon
law-enforcement tool is its high monetary cost. In 2008, the average cost per intercept order was
$47,624. 2008 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 121, at 25 tbl.5.
267. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
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the downside? The logic behind this argument is seductive, but it
ultimately wilts under scrutiny. The critical question is what
procedures would take surveillance's place. Would they be more or less
likely to intrude on personal privacy?
As noted in Part III.D, the alternatives to electronic
surveillance are just as bad at protecting privacy-perhaps even
worse. 268 If a heightened minimization requirement encourages police
to take a person's electronic communications from a third-party
server, 269 or to begin making dubious arrests as a pretext to search the
contents of cell phones, 270 then the end result might, perversely, be an
overall decrease in individual liberty. The risk of enhanced
minimization becoming a Pyrrhic victory for privacy does not appear
to be a risk worth taking.
Given how fast technology changes, critics may counter that
police in the near future will not have access to the same alternatives
to electronic surveillance they do today. They may not, for example, be
27 1
able to retrieve text messages after the fact from cellular providers.
There is already one service-TigerText-that allows its users to
create self-deleting text messages.2 7 2 These messages are not just
deleted from the recipient's phone, but from the provider network,
273
putting them beyond the reach of any subsequent investigation.
While the technology appears to have been created primarily for
adulterous spouses, 274 the criminal applications are readily apparent.
As a result, law enforcement may find itself relying more and more
heavily on real-time interceptions in the years ahead.

268. See supranotes 168-81 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (describing the process of retrieving
text-messages from storage).
272. Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting,N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at MM
30 ("An app called TigerText allows text-message senders to set a time limit from one minute to
30 days after which the text disappears from the company's servers on which it is stored and

therefore from the senders' and recipients' phones.").
273. Press Release, TigerText, TigerText Introduces New Mobile Privacy Network (Nov. 28,
2010), available at http://www.tigertextapp.com/tigertext-introduces-new-mobile-privacynetwork/ ('The new texting technology enables sender to select the message lifespan (from 1
minute up to 30 days), and once the duration is over, the message will not be available even on
server.").
274. See, e.g., Daniel Vasquez, Tigertext: The iPhone App that Protects Cheaters, Thwarts
Snooping Lovers, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 3, 2010, http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2010-03-03/business/sfl-tigertext-iphone-app-link-030310_1-iphone-people-textcheaters (describing the service as protecting cheaters "by removing or hiding sexy texts').
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However, even if technological changes force investigators to
intercept text messages more regularly, those investigators can still
sidestep the minimization requirement by intercepting messages from
non-suspects. 275 As Part IV noted, a person has no standing to
challenge improper minimization unless the government criminally
charges that person. For example, if the government intercepts all of
A's text messages, without performing any minimization, and uses
that information to indict B, then A will have no meaningful recourse.
Therefore, even with the aid of new technologies, the minimization
requirement will not meaningfully protect text message privacy.
3. Maintaining the Minimization Rule in this Context Risks
Watering Down the "Traditional" Minimization Rule
The analysis so far has mostly addressed the arguments
against enhancing minimization in the electronic-surveillance context.
Accepting those arguments, why not just leave the requirement as it
is? Why, if there is a chance of it ever protecting someone's privacy,
should we discard it?
The answer is that electronic minimization is worse than
useless. Its existence actually
undermines the traditional
minimization requirement and chips away at Title III's uniform
approach to phone conversations. To see how, one need only look at
the language of the ECPA.
In 1968, the original Title III required law enforcement to
"minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception under this chapter."276 Although Congress did not define
what it meant by minimization, the requirement was at least short
and straightforward. In 1986, however, the ECPA added a curious
caveat. It stated that "[i]n the event the intercepted communication is
in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language
or code is not reasonably available.., minimization may be
accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception. '277 The
Senate Judiciary Committee clarified that "it is contemplated that the
translator or decoder will listen to the tapes of an interception and
make available to the investigators the minimized portions. . . ,"278
For the first time since passing Title III, Congress explicitly endorsed
275. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
276. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802(5), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)).
277. ECPA of 1986 § 106(c)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006).
278. S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3584.
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a minimization scheme that allowed one or more agents to listen to all
27 9
intercepted conversations.
Where did this new language come from? Why did Congress
decide to add it? The legislative history does not say, though it is
notable that this "foreign/coded language" exception appeared at the
same time as, and bore a close resemblance to, the Senate
2 °
recommendations on how to minimize electronic intercepts. 8
Critically, both provisions called for one or more agents to read or
listen to all communications, minimize them after the fact, and then
pass the minimized transcripts along to other investigators on the
team. 28 ' Congress, in expanding the minimization requirement, tore
apart the unitary framework that had once governed phone calls. 282 In
its place, Congress left a bifurcated system, in which certain phone
calls are treated the same as electronic communications, at least for
minimization purposes. From the standpoint of privacy protection,
this development was a significant step backward.
A closely related problem is law enforcement confusion. How
should government agents determine which minimization standard to
use when? The Eastern District of New York highlighted this problem
recently in United States v. Semels, where it criticized Congress for
needlessly muddying the waters. 28 3 In granting a defendant's motion
to suppress, the court emphasized that federal agents had applied the
wrong standard, minimizing conversations after the fact that they
should have minimized contemporaneously. 28 4 The court, however,
blamed Congress for this mistake as much as it blamed the
investigators. As Judge Gleeson noted, the problem "no doubt
derive[d] from Congress's use of the word 'minimize' in consecutive
279. For an example of a court analyzing minimization under this standard, see United
States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
280. S. REP. No. 99-541, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585 ("[IUt is the Committee's
intention, that the minimization should be conducted by the initial law enforcement officials who
review the transcript. Those officials would delete non-relevant materials and disseminate to
other officials only that information which is relevant to the investigation.").
281. Id. at 3584-85.
282. The federal courts, admittedly, had been carving out exceptions to this unitary
framework for almost two decades. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)
("Many of the nonpertinent calls may have been very short. Others may have been one-time only
calls. Still other calls may have been ambiguous in nature or apparently involved guarded or
coded language. In all these circumstances agents can hardly be expected to know that the calls
are not pertinent prior to their termination.'). The ECPA is still important, however, as it
marked the first time that Congress explicitly approved such an approach.
283. United States v. Simels, No. 08-CR-640 (JG), 2009 WL 1924746, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 2,
2009) ("The terminology used by Congress in the 1986 amendment is unfortunate.').
284. Id.
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sentences in § 2518(5) to mean two different things."28 5 Given this
confusing language, federal agents ended up applying the wrong
standard
to their
wiretap
and
intercepting
nonpertinent
communications. The ECPA's minimization language helped no one
and hurt everyone. It led federal agents to violate a suspect's privacy,
while also destroying the government's case against that suspect.
The ECPA minimization requirement is beyond worthless; it is
detrimental to both privacy and law enforcement interests. Congress,
following the implicit advice of the pragmatists, should therefore do
away with it.
VI. CONCLUSION

In 1934, Congress faced a serious problem: how to regulate
increasingly intrusive but important wire surveillance. It responded
with the Federal Communications Act, effectively "minimizing" all
private conversations by banning wiretaps outright.28 6 However, poor
drafting and lax enforcement ruined this framework, allowing
287
government agents to violate the ban with impunity.
History repeated in 1968, when Congress again tried to reign
in rampant personal privacy violations. The result that time was Title
III and the birth of statutory minimization. 28 8 The tragedy in that case
was that Title III actually presented a workable solution and could
potentially have struck an enduring compromise between the
competing interests of law enforcement and privacy advocates,
permitting electronic surveillance but subjecting it to demanding
judicial oversight. The courts, however, unraveled that plan,
interpreting minimization down into a "reasonableness" requirement
28 9
rather than a hard and fast rule.
Tragedy turned to farce in 1986. Looking to update Title III
and keep pace with technological development, Congress had a perfect
opportunity to strengthen the privacy protections that courts had
progressively watered down. Instead, it passed the ECPA. While
ostensibly affirming and expanding the sphere of personal privacy, the
statute provided
no meaningful
protections for electronic
communications and actually undermined existing protections for oral
communication. Congress, in other words, lost sight of its original
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at *4.
See supranotes
See supranotes
See supranotes
See supranotes

42-44
52-56
65-67
78-82

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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goal, insisting on the outward formalities of minimization while
acquiescing in the very privacy violations minimization was designed
to prevent.
The flaws of modern surveillance law run deeper than the
ECPA minimization requirement, and overturning that provision
would not serve as a panacea. It would, however, be a welcome first
step toward restoring the spirit-rather than the empty formalism-of
Title III and true privacy protection.
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